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Global economic crisis in 2008 has increased the focus on the role of audit committee in 
ensuring integrity and transparency in corporate reporting. Audit committee 
characteristics are crucial in determining the ability of audit committee in carrying out 
its responsibilities effectively. Hence, this study aims to investigate the contribution of 
audit committee characteristics to audit committee effectiveness over corporate 
voluntary disclosure by Malaysian listed firms. This study also examines the effect of 
board of directors’ characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure. In addition, this 
study investigates the moderating effect of corporate board governance and concentrated 
ownership with audit committee effectiveness and corporate voluntary disclosure. Based 
on annual reports of 2006 and 2009, the study used 292 firms listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
The empirical results reveal that higher proportion of independent directors on audit 
committee, and totally independent audit committee members can lead to significantly a 
higher level of voluntary disclosure. Further, members with accounting expertise and 
multiple directorships, and also the size of audit committee are significantly associated 
with corporate voluntary disclosure. Surprisingly, results on board of directors indicate 
that none of the board attributes appear to determine corporate voluntary disclosure. The 
results further reveal that neither board governance nor concentrated ownership 
moderate the association between audit committee effectiveness and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. The findings of this study show that audit committee 
characteristics enhance the effectiveness of audit committee as a monitoring role, and 
hence mitigating the agency problems associated with corporate disclosure practices. 
Policy makers and regulatory bodies should interpret this evidence as motivation for 
them to strengthen corporate boards’ practices to effectively deal with the unique 
features of corporate governance in emerging economies such as Malaysia.   
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Tumpuan terhadap peranan jawatankuasa audit dalam memastikan integriti dan 
ketelusan pelaporan korporat meningkat sejak berlakunya krisis ekonomi global pada 
tahun 2008. Ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit adalah penting bagi menentukan kemampuan 
jawatankuasa audit melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya dengan berkesan. Oleh itu, kajian 
ini bertujuan menyelidik sumbangan ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit terhadap keberkesanan 
jawatankuasa tersebut ke atas pendedahan sukarela korporat oleh firma yang tersenarai 
di Malaysia. Kajian ini juga meneliti kesan ciri-ciri lembaga pengarah terhadap tahap 
pendedahan secara sukarela. Di samping itu, kajian ini menyiasat kesan moderasi ke atas 
hubungan tadbir urus lembaga pengarah  dan pemilikan yang tertumpu dengan 
keberkesanan jawatankuasa audit dan pendedahan sukarela korporat.  Berdasarkan 
laporan tahunan 2006 dan 2009, kajian ini melibatkan 292 buah firma yang tersenarai di 
Bursa Malaysia. Dapatan empirikal menunjukkan bahawa peningkatan kadar pengarah 
bebas dalam jawatankuasa audit  dan jawatankuasa audit yang ahlinya bebas sepenuhnya 
dapat meningkatkan pendedahan sukarela secara signifikan. Di samping itu, kepakaran 
ahli dalam perakaunan dan keahlian dalam pelbagai lembaga pengarah, serta  saiz 
jawatankuasa audit mempunyai kaitan dengan pendedahan sukarela korporat secara 
signifikan.  Agak memeranjatkan, dapatan bagi lembaga pengarah menunjukkan bahawa 
tiada sumbangan lembaga pengarah terhadap pendedahan sukarela korporat. Keputusan 
seterusnya mendapati bahawa tadbir urus lembaga mahupun pemilikan tertumpu tidak  
mempunyai kesan moderasi terhadap hubungan antara keberkesanan jawatankuasa audit 
dan tahap pendedahan sukarela korporat. Dapatan kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa ciri-
ciri jawatankuasa audit dapat meningkatkan keberkesanan jawatankuasa audit dalam 
memainkan peranannya sebagai pemantau. Ini seterusnya dapat mengurangkan masalah 
agensi berkaitan dengan amalan pendedahan korporat.  Pembuat dasar dan badan  
kawalselia boleh mentafsirkan bukti ini sebagai satu bentuk motivasi bagi mereka 
mengukuhkan amalan lembaga korporat dalam menangani secara berkesan ciri-ciri unik 
tadbir urus korporat dalam ekonomi baru seperti Malaysia. 
 
Katakunci: Jawatankuasa Audit, Lembaga Pengarah, Pendedahan Sukarela Korporat, 
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CHAPTER ONE INTR ODUC TION 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter is organized into the following sections. Section 1.2 discusses the 
background of the study. The problem statement is discussed in section 1.3. This is 
followed by research questions and research objectives in section 1.4 and 1.5 
respectively. Next, the significance and contribution of the study are explained in 
section 1.6. Then, the scope of the study is presented in section 1.7. Finally, section 
1.8 presents the organization of the study.   
 
1.2 Background of the Study  
Recent collapses of high profile business failures worldwide have captured great 
attention of investors, regulators, and academicians. The tragic collapses and losses 
of giant companies such as Enron Corporation, WorldCom and Tyco International in 
the United States, further  reinforced  the  critical  need  to improve  the  corporate  
governance  system  in  both  developed  and  developing  countries. Additionally,  
other  scandals  such  as  Parmalat  in  Italy  and  many  others  (e.g.  Bre-X and 
YBM Magnex in Canada, Royal Ahold in the Netherlands, Credit Lyonnais and 
Vivendi in France, Metalgesellschaft in Germany, and HIH Insurance Ltd. in  
Australia),  have  drawn attention  to  corporate  governance  reforms  around  the  
world (Bedard & Gendron, 2010; HassabElnaby, Said, & Wolfe, 2007; Kent, 
Routledge, & Stewart, 2010). Further, a spate of financial crisis in 2008 has been 
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